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f you asked a random person on the street what economists
study, you might get a response like inflation or unemployment.
The reason is pretty clear: such macroeconomic issues are crucially
important and do, in fact, occupy the attention of many economists,
including those in the Federal Reserve System. But there is a group
of microeconomists who are grappling with many issues beyond
what is normally thought of as the purview of economics—issues
such as crime, divorce, and abortion, among others.
The pioneer in this regard is University of Chicago econo-
mist Gary Becker. Among his best-known books are The Eco-
nomics of Discrimination (1957), The Economic Approach to Human
Behavior (1976), and ATreatise on the Family (1981). These books
apply the tools of economic analysis to issues that had long been
studied almost exclusively by sociologists and psychologists.
For instance, in A Treatise
on the Family, Becker looked at
parents’ “demand for chil-
dren.” He used “the price of
children and real income to
explain, among other things,
why rural fertility has tradi-
tionally exceeded urban fertil-
ity, why a rise in the wage rate
of working women reduces
their fertility, why various gov-
ernment programs…have sig-
nificantly affected the demand for children, and why families
with higher incomes have had more children, except during
the past 150 years in Western and developing countries.”
Not surprisingly, many noneconomists attacked Becker’s
work. It was, they maintained, inappropriate to use “rational
choice” analysis to think about such intimate personal issues.
People are not always cold, calculating utility maximizers, the
critics charged.
In the last 20 years, the practice of “economic imperialism”
has burgeoned, as many younger microeconomists have fol-
lowed Becker’s lead to explore new and exciting topics. One
of the best examples is Steven Levitt, also of the University of
Chicago. Levitt was recently awarded the John Bates Clark
Medal, which is given to the nation’s most outstanding econ-
omist under the age of 40, for his work on crime, corruption,
and education. Among his most cited—and criticized—recent
papers are “The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime” and
“An Economic Analysis of a Drug-Selling Gang’s Finances,”
both published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics.
In the December 2002 issue of the American Economic Review,
Levitt and co-author Mark Duggan took on an issue that has
long been of interest to some sports fans, but which few econ-
omists have even considered: corruption in sumo wrestling.
“The key institutional feature of sumo wrestling that
makes it ripe for corruption is the existence of a sharp non-
linearity in the payoff function for competitors,” the authors
write. A sumo tournament involves 66 wrestlers competing
in 15 bouts each. Awrestler who has a winning record—that
is, who has won at least 8 of his 15 matches—is guaranteed
to rise in the rankings, while a wrestler who has a losing
record is destined to fall. A wrestler’s rank determines his
prestige, salary, and the perks that he enjoys. For instance,
the lowest-ranked wrestlers must rise early each morning to
clean the building and prepare meals. 
There is a strong incentive, then, to achieve that eighth
victory in a tournament. “The critical eighth win…garners
a wrestler approximately 11 spots in the ranking, or roughly
four times the value of the
typical victory. Consequently,
a wrestler entering the final
match of a tournament with
a 7-7 record has far more to
gain from a victory than an
opponent with a record of,
say, 8-6 has to lose,” Duggan
and Levitt write. “We uncover
overwhelming evidence that
match rigging occurs in the
final days of sumo tourna-
ments. Wrestlers who are on the margin for attaining their
eighth victory win far more often than would be expected.”
Duggan and Levitt admit that high winning percentages
among wrestlers with seven victories is not proof positive of
corruption. After all, wrestlers may simply try harder in these
important matches because the benefits of winning are larger.
But the authors offer evidence against this alternative
hypothesis. For example, while the wrestler who is on the
cusp of winning his eighth match wins with surprisingly high
frequency, the next time he is paired against that same
wrestler he usually loses. “This result suggests that at least
part of the currency used in match rigging is promises of
throwing future matches in return for taking a fall today.”
Duggan and Levitt also tested their data against claims made
by two former wrestlers against specific competitors charged
with rigging matches. Their statistical analysis confirmed the
whistle-blowers’ stories.
One might say, “All of this is interesting. But what does
it have to do with economics?” Duggan and Levitt antici-
pate such criticism. They write: “The success of our study in
documenting the predicted patterns of corruption in one
context raises the hope that parallel studies with more sub-
stantive economic focus may yield similar results.” RF
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